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Twenty-first-century law enforcement organizations face a new and significant 
challenge — homeland security. On September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies 
throughout the United States were thrust into the “war on terrorism.” The current law 
enforcement business-as-usual attitude and incremental programmatic responses do not 
ensure a long-term success. Any act of terrorism will initially be a local issue that 
requires immediate response by various local agencies, such as medical, fire, and 
police—the communities “first responders.” Thus local law enforcement organizations 
must recognize and embrace the critical and essential role they play in homeland security 
and the war on terrorism.   
In today’s security environment, community policing is one of the most 
successful strategies employed by law enforcement organizations. Community policing 
focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that include 
aspects of traditional law enforcement, preventive measures, problem solving, 
community engagement, and partnerships. At some point in the future, the line between 
homeland security and everyday policing will become indistinguishable. At that point, 
homeland security institutionalization at the local level will have been fully achieved.   
This thesis attempts to identify the need for homeland security institutionalization 
in local law enforcement organizations. The thesis argues that community-based policing 
principles combined with other progressive law enforcement practices such as 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  PROBLEM 
On September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies throughout the United 
States were thrust into what was to become a “war on terrorism.” Most Americans 
believe that their local law enforcement organizations and other first responders are 
prepared to address any emergency, including a terrorist attack. Since the attacks of 
September 11th, most law enforcement organizations have responded to the terrorist 
threat in the most reasonable and appropriate manner possible, though they have often 
had limited means and lacked a thorough understanding of the scope and significance of 
their important role. In the future, local organizations’ response to this monumental 
challenge may determine the ultimate success of the war on terrorism in the United States 
and, consequently, throughout the world. The current U.S. business-as-usual attitude and 
incremental programmatic responses will not ensure a long-term success in the war on 
terrorism. Thus, local organizations have a very real, but and incorrigible, role to play in 
the global war on terrorism. “When considering the response to terrorist attacks, the 
resources and assistance provided by state and local authorities is often regarded as 
critical.”1     
But if the United States is to have an efficient and effective response to homeland 
security issues, law enforcement organizations, especially local law enforcement 
organizations, must begin a long-term process of evolvement. First, they must recognize 





                                                 
1 Alejandro del Carmen and Jonathan R. White, et al, Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. 
Alejandro del Carmen (Toronto, Canada: Patterson, 2003), 7. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 2002), vii-x. 
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Terrorism is no longer a phenomenon that occurs only in far-away lands; it is a serious 
domestic issue that local organizations must address: “Every act of terrorism is a local 
event.”3    
“Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and 
other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies that occur.4 Ultimately, our success in the realm of homeland 
security will depend on law enforcement organizations’ open-mindedness, progressive 
thought, and innovative strategies. Terrorist organizations and individual terrorists 
quickly can and will adapt to new and more challenging environments. Local law 
enforcement organizations must do the same.       
One of law enforcement’s, especially the local agencies’, most successful 
strategies is community policing, which has been primarily championed by the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS). As 
described by COPS,  
Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the 
delivery of police services that include aspects of traditional law 
enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community 
engagement, and partnerships. The community policing model balances 
reactive responses to calls for service with proactive problem-solving 
centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing 
requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of 
both identifying and effectively addressing these issues.5 
Community policing has had a dramatic positive effect on America’s 
communities. For example, the Chicago Police Department has experienced significant 
success with their community policing efforts, known as the Chicago Alternative Policing 
                                                 
3 David L. Carter, “Homeland Security Threat Levels: Developing a Guide for Executives,” in 
National Community Policing Conference Held in Washington D.C., June 21-June, 23, 2004, ed., 
Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice (Washington D.C.: Community 
Policing Consortium, Community Links Magazine, August 2004), 7. 
4 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2. 
5 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, “What Is Community Policing?" Cops Office, 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?item=36/ (accessed July 17, 2005). 
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Strategy (CAPS). “CAPS works- and because of CAPS, Chicago is a safer place to live. 
Ten years after Chicago first debuted the groundbreaking crime-fighting initiative, which 
relies heavily on cooperation between police, residents and City agencies, proof is in the 
numbers. In 2002, there were 93,655 fewer incidents of serious crime than in 1993 — 
more than 14,000 fewer sexual assaults, almost 17,000 fewer robberies.”6 
Although many organizations have experienced some success by applying 
community policing principles on a limited or programmatic basis, it is clear that 
organizations that have institutionalized community policing, adopting it as a core 
philosophy or philosophical underpinning, have experienced by far the greatest successes. 
Organizations that desire long-term success in their critical homeland security efforts 
should seriously using community policing principles as a template along with their other 
progressive policing principles. To achieve the greatest effectiveness, “Homeland 
Security, like community policing, must be adopted agency-wide to realize its full 
potential and effectiveness. This adoption should be reflected by integrating the 
homeland security responsibility into the agency’s mission statement, goals, policies and 








                                                 
6 Chicago Police Department, “Caps At 10: A Decade Of Cooperation, Creativity and Commitment 
Has Made Chicago Safer,” Chicago Police Department Official Web Site, http://www.cityof 
chicago.org/city/webportalContentItemAction/ (accessed July 18, 2005). 
7 Jose Docobo, “Community-Policing As the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at 
the Local Law Enforcement Level,” (Master’s Thesis, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2005), 35. 
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Figure 1.   Homeland Security Institutionalization 
 
 
B.  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Local law enforcement organizations play a critical role in protecting America 
from terrorist attacks by responding to attacks that may occur and assisting in the 
recovery effort if a terrorist attack is successful.8 At present, most law enforcement 
organizations address homeland security issues as discrete projects. Agencies have 
responded to homeland security issues on a limited or project basis, partially from 
necessity, as in the response to the 9/11 attacks and other threats that became known post-
9/11.  However, in this rapidly changing world, law enforcement agencies’ future success 
will require a more holistic approach to homeland security. And to implement a holistic 
approach, the law enforcement community must first phase out its current practice of 
addressing homeland security on a project basis and adopt homeland security instead as a 
                                                 
8 National Strategy for Homeland Security, vii-x. 
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philosophical underpinning. In effect, this means that a homeland security mindset must 
permeate law enforcement organizations: only that will ultimately result in a homeland- 
security institutionalization of policing in the twenty-first century. It is essential, 
therefore, that local law enforcement organizations discover and formulate the steps 
necessary to encourage and facilitate the institutionalization of homeland security in their 
own agencies.  
The challenge that this thesis addresses is the challenge that faces each and every 
local law enforcement agency in America today: the need to develop appropriate 
strategies, procedures, and guidelines that will effect the institutionalization of homeland 
security in their individual organizations. The thesis is grounded on the premise that 
community policing, with all that that model encompasses, is the most effective way to 
deliver police services in the war on terrorism. This institutionalization of homeland 
security will assist local agencies to achieve the primary goals of homeland security: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. 
• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism. 
• Minimize the damage and maximize recover from possible attacks. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  TOPICS FOR STUDY/ REVIEW 
Local law enforcement agencies must develop appropriate strategies, procedures, 
and guidelines for implementing their homeland security policies and practices, their 
success in that endeavor will depend largely on a synergetic application of theories from 
multiple disciplines. An abundance of information related to homeland security is readily 
available in a variety of forms and from multiple sources. Numerous periodicals are now 
devoted to this subject and publications from both private and governmental entities are 
published daily. To stay abreast of this increasingly complex and ever-changing subject, 
it is essential to draw information from diverse sources, not just traditional journals, texts, 
and books. The new topical magazines such as Homeland Protection Professional, HS 
Today, and Homeland Defense Journal offer valuable and timely information, and 
informational and organizational Web sites and Web journals (blogs) often prove 
invaluable to the critical reader or researcher.      
 
1.  Terrorism  
This thesis is designed to address the problems and issues surrounding the twenty-
first-century threat of terrorism. The thesis requires, therefore, some background 
knowledge of both the threat and its implicit impetus for institutional change. For our 
purposes here, it is the causes and effects of terrorism in and on the United States that are 
especially pertinent. In this regard, one of the most respected scholars is Bruce Hoffman, 
whose book Inside Terrorism provides meaningful insights into the nature of the terrorist 
threat.9 Hoffman emphasizes the need for change or evolvement in response to terrorist 
activity, noting that “the emergence of this new breed of terrorist adversary means that 
nothing less than a sea-change about terrorism and the policies required to counter it will 
be required.”10 In considering the future of terrorism in America in particular, 
                                                 
9 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
10 Ibid., 212. 
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Christopher Hewitt points out the “general agreement that two groups, Islamic and 
rightist extremists, are likely to engage in terrorist activity in America.”11 Jonathan R. 
White highlights the changing face of terrorism in America, arguing that “terrorism is 
changing, groups and infrastructures are disappearing, and violent religious zealots and 
ideological fanatics are replacing them.”12 None of the claims and arguments in the 
terrorism literature has been seriously contested. Indeed, most scholars agree that 
terrorism will continue to be a threat to America and that terrorism is changing. Thus, 
those of us who are challenged to address terrorism and are responsible for homeland 
security issues must also change to meet the threat.  
 
2.  Organizational Change 
Having recognized and acknowledged the threat of terrorism to America’s 
communities, local law enforcement’s challenge now is how to quickly and sufficiently 
meet the requirement for dramatic organizational change. To do so, a thorough review 
and understanding of change theory is essential. An initial problem that John P. Kotter 
and Leonard A. Sclesinger note is that “people resist change due to self-interest, due to 
misunderstanding of the facts or lack of trust, because they assess the situation differently 
than the leadership of an organization, and because they have a low tolerance for 
change.13  As Charles R. Swanson, Leonard Territo, and Robert Taylor demonstrate, 
change theory is readily applicable to police administration.14 The management of 
change in police organizations has also been thoroughly explored by the Community 
Policing Consortium, which comprises five of the leading police organizations in the 
United States: 
 
                                                 
11 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 119. 
12 Jonathan R. White, Terrorism: An Introduction, 3rd edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomas 
Learing, 2001), 219. 
13 John P. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change,” in Managing People 
and Organizations, ed. John Gabarro (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992), 395–408. 
14 Lenard Territo, Charles R. Swanson, and Robert W. Taylor, Police Administration, 2nd edition 
(New York: MacMillan, 1988). 
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• International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)  
• National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE)  
• National Sheriffs Association (NSA)  
• Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)  
• Police Foundation  
These five organizations play a principal role in the development of community-
policing research, training, and technical assistance. The Community Policing 
Consortium’s contribution to the topic is significant and provides practical, real-world 
strategies to facilitate change in law enforcement organizations.15  
 
3.  Community Policing 
The seminal work on modern community policing is Herman Goldstein’s 
Problem- Oriented Policing.16  Among the topics that Goldstein effectively addresses are 
change and problem solving. No study of community policing would be complete 
without a reference to Goldstein. The organization most responsible for the effective 
implementation of community policing in America is the United States Department of 
Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), through its training, 
research, and funding activities. The COPS office publishes numerous works related to 
community policing and has made excellent reference materials available on-line. The 
COPS publication “Local Law Enforcement Responds to Terrorism,”17 published shortly 
after 9/11, readily applies community policing principles to homeland security issues. 
Partnerships within the community and with other law enforcement agencies are also 
integral to the community policing effort and its application to homeland security issues. 
The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) provides outstanding publications related 
to community policing and problem solving. For example, PERF provides advice to local 
                                                 
15 The Police Organization in Transition: Organization and Framework (Washington D.C.: 
Community Policing Consortium), Community Policing Consortium, http://www.community 
policing.org/pforgtrans/ (accessed April 13, 2004). 
16 Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990). 
17 Robert Chapman et al., Local law Enforcement Responds to Terrorism: Lessons in Prevention and 
Preparedness (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2002). 
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law enforcement agencies to assist in addressing homeland security issues with the aid of 
community policing principles.18 Most progressive organizations in the law enforcement 
community fully embrace and have institutionalized community policing. There is little 
disagreement related to its necessity, applicability, or effectiveness. A comprehensive 
longitudinal study of community policing implementation and effectiveness in the 
Chicago, Illinois, Police Department highlights the positive and necessary role of 
community policing.19 
In sum, the multiple disciplines, theories, and strategies associated with homeland 
security require not only a thorough and meaningful review of the literature, but a 
flexible and pragmatic review of both traditional and nontraditional sources. 
 
B.  HYPOTHESIS 
The challenges American law enforcement agencies face changed radically on 
September 11, 2001. In addition to their traditional crime-fighting mandate, agencies 
became responsible for protecting their communities from terrorism, hopefully in 
partnership with other local as well as state and federal organizations. To address 
terrorism efficiently, agencies must now institutionalize homeland security policies and 
procedures.  Doing so effectively means applying existing community policing principles 
to homeland security in their efforts to secure their communities against terrorist attacks.    
 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
My research began with a substantial review of the existing literature pertaining to 
defense against terrorism at the local level. This thesis focuses in particular on the 
exploration and synthesis of three discrete topics: community policing, organizational 
change, and homeland security. Its overall purpose is to demonstrate that local law 
                                                 
18  Gerard R. Murphy, Martha R. Plotkin, et al, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: 
Strategies for Local Law Enforcement (Washington D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, March 2004). 
19 Wesley G. Skogan, Longitudinal Evaluation of Chicago’s Community Policing Program, 1993–
2001 (Ann Arbor, MI: Northwestern University, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research, 2004), 2nd ICPSR version, http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/policing.html 
(accessed 27 April 2005). 
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enforcement organizations have a significant role to play in homeland security, a role that 
is not being addressed in the most efficient and effective way possible. The thesis will 
show that the institutionalization of homeland security, through a synthesis of proven 
strategies such as community policing, will provide a greater likelihood of success by 
local law enforcement organizations as they undertake and embrace their critical 
homeland security role. Finally, the thesis will cover practical strategies and matrices for 
developing a timely and accurate assessment of all phases of homeland security 
institutionalization.  
First, the threat—terrorism—is defined and discussed, because it is essential that 
local law enforcement bodies understand the overall nature of the threats that the 
institutionalization of  homeland security is intended to address. Thus the examination of 
terrorism includes a discussion of both domestic and foreign terrorism. And the crucial 
impact of technology, especially the intranet, on those is also presented. 
Second, community policing, which provides a model for this thesis, is defined 
and discussed as a fundamental aspect of homeland security institutionalization at the 
local law enforcement level. The application of community policing principles to 
homeland security practices is then described to provide practical and scalable examples 
that organizations can apply in their own homeland security efforts. A discussion of 
intelligence-led policing and community fear reduction is included to ensure a more 
holistic approach to homeland security–related issues and concerns. 
The ideas, information, and data used in this thesis are derived from numerous 
sources. My personal experiences and knowledge gained as a line officer, manager, and 
member of the command staff of a very progressive local law enforcement organization 
became the bonding agent for the application of information and data gleaned from 
academic sources. In addition, my experience as a private security consultant specializing 
in providing homeland security–related services to public entities provided much 
practical insight, including a good understanding of their real-world affect on 
organizations outside the official law enforcement community such as private and 
governmental agencies.  
   
12 
Professional journals dedicated to policing and homeland security issues provide 
the most current relevant information on these topics. However, since many of the topics 
are fundamental principles of modern policing and homeland security, related books and 
governmental publications are also appropriate and necessary sources. In addition, I 
found that a review of texts and articles related to organizational change was also useful. 
In regard to community policing in particular, as David Carter points out, in his 
article Law Enforcement Intelligence, “Community policing has developed skills in many 
law enforcement officers that directly support new counterterrorism responsibilities: The 
scientific approach to problem solving, environmental scanning, effective communication 
with the public, fear reduction, and community mobilization to deal with problems are 
among the important attributes community policing brings to this challenge.”20  
Community policing skills, because of a common understanding in the law enforcement 
community, can form a template for the application of homeland security principles and 
strategies using an appropriate change model. The synergy that results from its 
exploration and synthesis provides appropriate academic support for the concept of 
homeland security institutionalization. 
 
                                                 
20 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence. 
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III.  THE THREAT: TERRORISM 
A.  TERRORISM DEFINED 
Prior to examining terrorist organizations, it is important that a proper foundation 
is laid and that terrorism is fully operationalized and conceptualized.  The primary guide 
to the response to terrorism (both prevention and post-incident response) in the United 
States is the National Response Plan.  The National Response Plan defines terrorism as 
any activity that:  
(1) involves an act that  
(a) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical 
infrastructure or key resources; and  
(b) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State 
or other subdivision of the United States; and 
(2) appears to be intended  
(a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(b) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or  
(c) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,     
assassination or kidnapping.21 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation further defines terrorism as “The unlawful 
use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating 
entirely within the United States or its territories without foreign direction committed 
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, 
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”22 
 
B.  TERRORIST GROUPS  
People are drawn into right-wing terrorist organizations incrementally and usually 
through social networks. Seemingly innocent relationships can draw individuals into 
terrorist organizations. However, “In a few cases, individuals become terrorists because 
of anger at perceived mistreatment or injustice.”23 Another possible reason that people 
                                                 
21 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 73. 
22 Terrorism in the United States 199.  
23 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 78. 
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are attracted to right-wing terrorist organizations or activities is that the “American 
extremist right seeks an outlet for social frustration in a paramilitary culture.”24 These 
terrorists may see themselves as “Dream Warriors”25 And as self-described warriors, they 
submerge themselves in the paramilitary culture, are social outcasts, and base their 
individual identity in violence and their perception of a “warrior” subculture. Persons 
drawn into or who engage in terrorism as Dream Warriors are likely to operate as lone- 
wolf-type terrorists, targeting a wide range of enemies whom they believe are attempting 
to destroy their idea of American society and culture. In reality, it is likely that many of 
these so-called dream warriors would not be able to cope with the mental and physical 
challenges associated with public service in one of the fields or units they imitate.   
For many terrorists a profound distrust of government is the motivation. For 
example, a large number of Americans believe that, at Waco, the FBI set fire to the 
Branch Davidians’ compound, or shot at the Davidians when they were trying to escape 
the fire. Many of these same people also believe that the federal government is setting up 
concentration camps for dissident Americans, especially white Protestant Americans, and 
is planning a takeover of the United States by United Nations troops. The supposed aim 
of the takeover is to set up a “new world order” that will include a one-world government 
led by Jews.    
“American terrorism differs from terrorism in other countries in that a significant 
proportion of terrorist acts have been carried out by unaffiliated individuals rather than by 
members of terrorist organizations.”26 These terrorists are called “lone wolves.” “Many 
law enforcement officials and terrorism analysts thinks that such loners will pose the 
greatest threat to the security of the United States since they are hard to identify before 
they act, and hard to track down afterwards.”27 One example of a “lone wolf” operation is 
Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
                                                 
24 James W. Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in the Post-Vietnam America (New York: 
Hill & Wang), quoted in White, Terrorism: An Introduction, 29. 
25 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 111.   
26 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 78. 
27 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 79. 
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City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, which killed 168 people. The bombing is believed to 
have been intended as an act of revenge for the perceived mistreatment of the Branch 
Davidians, and thus some consider McVeigh’s act as an attack by a terrorist engaged in a 
leaderless resistance.   
During the 1980s, law enforcement agencies made significant strides in 
combating domestic terrorism. By 1990 American law enforcement bodies had developed 
techniques for dealing with terrorism that included the infiltration of domestic right wing 
groups and effective monitoring of suspected terrorist organizations. Informants were 
effectively used at all levels of the suspected terrorist organizations, and for a time, it 
appeared that law enforcement had turned the tide on threat of domestic terrorism.  
However, in an effort to survive, many groups decided to change their tactics and 
organizational structure.  
The concept of “leaderless resistance has been adopted by many right-wing 
extremists, so that several recent deadly attacks have been carried out by lone terrorists, 
who have only tenuous links with any extremist organization.”28 Ku Klux Klan leader 
Louis Beam was one of the first domestic terrorists to expose the idea of “leaderless 
resistance.” Beam believed that “extremists groups did not need to have extensive 
organizations; it was necessary to do something. Resistance in any form was acceptable.  
There was no need to coordinate activities, resistance was enough.”29 Because, as James 
Wilson points out in his study of political organizations, “the fundamental purpose of any 
political organization is to maintain itself.”30 Although the organization and operation of 
right-wing terrorists has shifted to a leaderless resistance-type strategy, in many 
instances, it continues to appear in the broad public perception that these groups are 
operating from a broad and unified base. It is likely that the promotion of this perception 
by domestic extremist organizations is directly related to the need to raise funds. “The 
                                                 
28 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 102.  
29 White, Terrorism: An Introduction, 43. 
30 James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973), quoted in Martha 
Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 10: 4 (Dec. 1987), 13–31. 
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perception of a unified threat is the result of the need to raise money,”31 often for 
personal gain rather than some idealistic adherence to an overall strategy.  
 
C.  NETWAR 
“Netwar” is a phenomenon very similar to leaderless resistance that is being used 
by terrorists both in and outside the United States. The term “netwar” is used to describe 
terrorist activities by groups that have “relatively flat hierarchies, decentralization, and 
delegation of decision-making authority and loose lateral ties among dispersed groups 
and individuals.”32 In reality, these are not new concepts. In past conflicts, 
“underground” forces engaged in guerilla warfare mastered this concept. For example, 
during the occupation of France in World War II, there was a significant underground 
movement that fought against the Germans and supported allied efforts. Today, that 
underground would likely be classified as a leaderless resistance or, perhaps, 
“netwarriors.”    
Increased lethality has accompanied this shift in organizational structure. Like 
many foreign terrorist groups, domestic militant right-wing Christian terrorist  
organizations have embraced the “legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, 
a sense of alienation, and the existence of a terrorist movement in which activists are the 
constituents, and preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of 
enemies” (i.e., Jews, Blacks, Gays, foreigners).33 “The Christian Patriots do not appear to 
recognize any of the political moral or practical considerations that constrain most other 
terrorists groups from causing mass death and destruction.”34 The adoption of such a 
philosophy makes it much more likely that this group, and others like them, will escalate 
                                                 
31 David W. Brannan, “Right-Wing Terrorism,” lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, Monterey, CA, November 4, 2004. 
32 Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ron Feldt, and Michael Zanini, The New 
Terrorism ( RAND, 1999), 61. 
33 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities,” in Paul Wilkinson, ed., 
Technology and Terrorism (London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993), 17. 
12Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 114–115.   
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their operations to a level that would allow them to utilize chemical, biological, 
radiological or nuclear attacks (CBRN) if they were to develop those capabilities.      
In addition to the philosophical shift associated with organizational structure that 
is seen among right-wing extremists, there has been a shift in their actual ability to cause 
mass casualties. “If, however, terrorist lethality continues to increase and the constraints, 
self-imposed and otherwise, imposed on terrorists in the commission of mass murder 
erode further, actions involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons could become 
more attractive to some terrorists groups.”35 A key factor contributing to terrorism’s 
raising lethality is the ease of adaptations across the technological spectrum.36 The almost 
limitless availability of technology in the United States affords terrorists the unfettered 
ability to develop weapons, delivery systems, and systems that inhibit their detection.  
Like most Americans who use the internet on a daily basis, many right-wing 
militias in the United States have already been actively using the internet. They use the 
internet to communicate with each other and to share propaganda and other information.  
In fact, right-wing terrorists were on the cutting edge when it came to the use of the 
internet. Louis Beam, “in the early 1980s pioneered the use of computer bulletin boards 
as a means for like-minded hate-mongers to both communicate with one another and 
circulate literature and information otherwise outlawed by the U.S. and Canadian postal 
services.”37 As any organization, military, or business will confirm, effective 
communication is the key to successful operations. Right–wing terrorists have adopted 
the Internet as a primary tool for communicating within their organizations and with the 
rest of the world. While their message may seem nonsensical to the “average rational    
person,” they have mastered the art of delivering their message to their desired audience. 
Other communication devices such as mobile telephones (many of which are disposable  
                                                 
35 Hoffman, “Terrorist Targeting,” 23. 
36 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Countering The New Terrorism, 7–38, 
prepared by RAND, 1999.  
37 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 118. 
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and untraceable), pagers, and BlackBerry devices also enable terrorists’ limitless, 
unfettered, and almost untraceable communication, thus increasing their opportunities for 
lethality.   
Ease of communication throughout the world may also have increased the 
likelihood of more significant attacks for another reason. The dissemination of 
information and news, and America’s veracious appetite for news the very second an 
event occurs, may actually have spawned terrorist acts or threats. In his book Terrorism, 
Walter Lacqueur, for instance, states that “The rise of indiscriminate terrorism is partly a 
product of the modern electronic mass media, as terrorists may commit these acts almost 
exclusively for the publicity that they generate.”38 However, there is not complete 
agreement among the experts on this subject. Some believe, to the contrary, that “because 
terrorists may no longer be completely dependent upon the news media to disseminate 
their point of view, the indiscriminate violence that is so often employed to attract news-
media attention may no longer be as necessary.”39 
 
D.  RELIGIOUS/NATIONALISTS TERRORISM  
“Another key reason for terrorism’s increased lethality is the growing incidence 
of violence motivated by religious, as well as a nationalist/separatist imperative.”40 In 
1998, in his book Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman found that “the religious imperative 
for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.”41 
“Terrorism motivated in whole or part by religious imperatives has often led to more 
intense acts of violence that have produced considerably higher levels of fatalities then 
the relatively more discriminating and less lethal incidents of violence perpetrated by 
secular terrorist organizations.”42  
                                                 
38 Walter Lacqueur, Terrorism (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1977), 105, quoted in Kevin 
Soo Hoo, Seymour Goodman, and Lawrence Greenburg, Survival 39: 3 (autumn 1997, Military Module), 
137.   
39 Lacquere, Terrorism, 105, quoted in Soo Hoo et al., 140. 
40 Hoffman, “Terrorist Targeting,” 16.  
41 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 87.  
42 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 93.  
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E.  ECO-TERRORISTS 
Eco-terrorist likely pose the greatest threat of an domestic terrorists in the United 
Stats at this time this assertion is reinforced by Larry Copeland’s more recent finding that 
since 1976 “eco-terrorists have committed more than 1,100 criminal acts; have caused 
property damage estimated at least $110 million,”43 while going to lengths to ensure that 
people are not harmed. In June of 2004, the FBI stated that eco-terrorism “was the 
nation’s top domestic terrorism threat.”44  
 
F.  DOMESTIC RIGHT-WING TERRORISTS 
It seems reasonable that with the ever-increasing concern about the deployment of 
a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and the likelihood that right-wing groups are much 
more predisposed to using WMD, right-wing terrorist are now the more serious domestic 
threat. Many right-wing terrorists in the United States justify their actions by asserting a 
religious justification. In this respect they are no different than the terrorists that pervert 
Islam to justify their actions. In addition, like foreign terrorists, domestic terrorists have 
shifted their operational philosophies and structures in efforts to avoid detection and 
increase effectiveness. The effective use of technology by domestic terrorists is, 
alarmingly, much like that of foreign terrorists. It is quite possible that the tactics used in 
the Middle East today will soon be used in the United States. Roadside bombs, 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, snipers, all effective terrorist tools, will 
likely be deployed in America as extremists increase operations in response to the 
diversification of America, or, possibly, just because some common criminals choose to 
expand their forte by including terrorist acts. Domestic terrorism must become a priority 
for government at all levels, and it will, when it becomes necessary to shift finite 
resources to more adequately address this issue. Fortunately, the lessons learned in the 
fight against international terrorism can be readily applied to domestic terrorism. There is 
no need to “reinvent the wheel” when it comes to combating domestic terrorism. First 
                                                 
43 Larry Copeland,“Domestic Terrorism: New Trouble at Home,” USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2004, A1 
<https://wwww.usatoday> (accessed November 14, 2004). 
44 Copeland,“Domestic Terrorism.” 
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responders, as well as first preventors, can readily apply the lessons learned in the 
broader struggle against terrorism to the domestic threat.   
 
G.  THE GATHERING STORM? 
Is America ignoring “a gathering storm,” the domestic terrorist threat?  Probably 
not, the external threat is a much greater priority at this time, and the appropriate tactics 
and tools can be easily turned against the domestic terrorists when it becomes necessary.  
Perhaps success in foreign lands will preclude the need for a major battle against 
domestic terrorism in the United States.   
However, homeland security leaders should seriously consider and be prepared to 
respond in light of the recent trend in terrorist activity in which Islamists perpetrate 
violent and deadly terrorist attacks in their home or adopted countries. The July 7, 2005, 
attacks on London’s transit system that killed fifty-two people and wounded 
approximately 700 were carried out by Islamic extremists who were British citizens of 
Pakistani origin.45  Likewise, the Madrid train bombings and the bombings in Morocco, 
Bali, and Turkey were all perpetrated, entirely or in part, by homegrown Islamists with 
no outside guidance or direction from a larger organization such as Al Qaeda. This 
apparent fusion of Islamist extremism, leaderless resistance, and netwar may provide 
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IV.  THE RESPONSE 
A.  COMMUNITY POLICING 
One of the most successful strategies employed by law enforcement, especially 
local law enforcement agencies, is community policing. The U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the organization most 
responsible for the advent of community policing: 
Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the 
delivery of police services that include aspects of traditional law 
enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community 
engagement, and partnerships. The community policing model balances 
reactive responses to calls for service with proactive problem-solving 
centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing 
requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of 
both identifying and effectively addressing these issues.46 
Community policing, especially the commitment to partnerships, problem 
solving, and organizational change, is credited by most law enforcement professionals for 
the ongoing drop in both crime rates and the public’s fear of crime. The nationwide 
decrease in crime rates corresponds strongly with the acceptance and application of 
community policing throughout the law enforcement community.  
Moreover, the law enforcement community, at all levels, plays a critical role in 
the ongoing efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; to reduce 
America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and to 
minimize the damage and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies. The law enforcement community in cooperation with other first 
responders/preventers must evolve to meet this challenge. Programs and projects, while a 
temporary and very necessary fix at this point, are not sufficient to meet the nation’s 
ongoing and future challenges and secure the safety and security of its communities. To 
be truly effective and to appropriately fulfill its vital role in homeland security the law 
                                                 
46 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, "What Is Community Policing?," Cops Office, 
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enforcement community must evolve, adapt, and integrate homeland security into its very 
fiber as a basic tenet and philosophy. Community policing is a readily available, 
understandable, and adaptable tool for achieving these goals.  
The law enforcement community plays a major role in many of the critical 
mission areas included in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.47 Therefore, it is 
essential that law enforcement take a long-term approach in fulfilling its role. By the 
1980s the law enforcement community had evolved into a professional model of policing. 
Although very effective for a time, especially in quelling the rampant corruption that had 
engulfed many organizations, this model eventually could not effectively keep up with 
the rising crime rates. As a result, the primary reasons for this professional model’s 
demise was its focus on response rather than on prevention, addressing the root causes of 
crime, and the fact that law enforcement officers had, in effect, become separated from 
their communities. 
Thus community policing was created—actually, re-created—as a response to the 
obvious shortcomings of the current professional model. Community policing is an 
organization-wide philosophy and management approach that promotes proactive 
partnerships and community engagement to address the causes of crime and disorder, the 
fear of crime and disorder, and other community issues. And, at this point in history, 
there is no “other” community issue that is more critical than homeland security.  
Research shows that law enforcement organizations throughout the world have 
reaped tremendous rewards from the application and integration of community policing 
principles. Crime rates across America continue to decline. Crime in New York City, for 
example, has been declining for the past seventeen years.48 Similar achievements are 
possible in the homeland security realm. The wheel need not be reinvented. Most 
progressive law enforcement organizations have adopted community policing as their 
core philosophy and are already engaged in the process of needed change. A similar 
                                                 
47 National Strategy for Homeland Security, viii-ix. 
48 Al Baker, “Crime Numbers Keep Dropping Across the City,” Nytimes.com, December 31, 2005 
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model, if applied to law enforcement’s homeland security goals, could prove very 
effective. For example, if law enforcement organizations simply applied eight major 
principles of community policing to their homeland security efforts, a seamless transition 
from addressing homeland security on a programmatic basis to homeland security 
institutionalization could occur. The eight principles of community policing that are most 














• Change • Leadership 
 
Table 1. Community Policing Principles 
 
Community policing is not without its detractors. Since its inception, community 
policing has been criticized as being “soft on crime” and “turning cops into social 
workers.” Neither criticism is warranted; both have been thoroughly refuted. Lower 
crime rates, safer communities, and a marked decrease in fear of crime are testaments to 
the effectiveness of community policing. However, some in the law enforcement 
community believe that 9/11 and the advent of local law enforcement’s homeland 
security responsibilities sounded the death knell for community policing. One 
academician, in describing community policing’s future, asserts that “homeland security 
and community policing are not complementary philosophies.”49 Thus far, there has not  
 
 
                                                 
49 Willard M. Oliver, “Homeland Security: The Death Knell for Community Policing,” Crime & 
Justice International (March/April 2006), 9. 
   
24 
been a wholesale abandonment of community policing; however, this possibility must be 
recognized and resisted if organizations are to be holistically successful over the long 
term.  
The law enforcement community must evolve if it is to meet its homeland 
security commitments. This evolution should include the adoption of homeland security 
as a philosophy and core value: homeland security institutionalization is key. Since the 
law enforcement community has recently (over the last 15–20 years) experienced a 
successful paradigm shift to the community policing model, it is completely appropriate 
that this model be adapted for homeland security purposes. Such adaptation and 
application would enable organizations to quickly, efficiently, and effectively provide 
long-term, lasting solutions to homeland security problems, thereby fulfilling their vital 
role in our nation’s security.  
  
B.  PARTNERSHIPS 
Partnerships at all levels are the key to successful community policing efforts and 
therefore are also essential to the successful prevention of terrorist attacks. To be truly 
effective, first responders and members of the private sector must work together in a 
coordinated effort toward this common goal. Strong partnerships with other first 
responders at all levels of government and with citizen groups and the rest of the private 
sector will greatly enhance communities’ preparedness for and prevention of a terrorist 
attack, their mitigation and management of a disastrous incident, and their response to 
and recovery from an attack, should one occur. Organizations must ensure that those 
partnerships are mutually and wholly beneficial and that the relationships, processes, and 
outcomes are agreed upon by all stakeholders.  
 
1.  Community Partnerships 
Law enforcement organizations must continue and enhance their partnerships 
with individual community members and organizations such as Crime Watch and 
Citizens on Patrol. These community groups should be given access to as much 
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information and training as is possible and practical. Community groups and the general 
public should be given every opportunity to participate in preparedness and protection 
efforts, including participation in preparedness and response drills. Local Crime Watch 
and Citizens on Patrol groups have been successful and beneficial partners to law 
enforcement organizations. “Neighborhood Watch groups deter crime not only by using 
traditional approaches such as foot and car patrols, but also by focusing on quality of life 
issues that can enhance neighborhoods.”50 The activities and strategies employed by 
community groups prior to 9/11 are still effective and readily applicable to communities’ 
homeland security needs. In addition, organizations should understand that many, if not 
most, members of the community want to have an active role in homeland security. Law 
enforcement should facilitate that role whenever practical and possible. “Citizenship 
carries responsibilities, which include contributing more than just tax dollars to the cause 
of protecting our way of life. In times of national emergency we have an obligation to 
play a more active role. This principle is well grounded in our history, dating back to the 
minutemen, who traded in plowshares for muskets so they could fight the American 
Revolution.”51  
 
2.  Partnerships with the Business Community  
Partnerships with the business community and private sector as a whole are 
essential. Eighty-five percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated 
by the private sector.52 Law enforcement organizations should ensure that the business 
community (including entertainment venues) is completely aware of all the resources 
provided by all levels of the government. Those resources include, but are not limited to, 
guidelines and directives issued by the Department of Homeland Security, participation  
 
                                                 
50 Office of The New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, “Neighborhood Watch Groups Cited 
for Achievements,” October 23, 2001  <http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ 
crime/neighborhood_watch/oct23_01.html> (accessed March 9, 2006). 
51 Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from 
Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 159. 
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in state-sponsored preparedness exercises and intelligence-sharing opportunities, and 
other regional cooperative efforts. Successful public-private partnerships include twelve 
essential components:53 
 
• Common goals • A tangible purpose 
• Common tasks • Clearly identified leaders 
• Knowledge of participating 
agencies’ capabilities 
• Operational planning 
• Well-defined projected outcomes • Agreement by all partners as to how 
the partnership will proceed 
• A timetable • Mutual commitment to providing 
necessary resources 
• Education for all involved • Assessment and reporting 
Table 2. Essential Components for Successful Public-Private Partnerships 
 
Coordination with the business community, including planning and operations, to 
ensure smooth and efficient daily operations, business continuity, the operation of long-
term seasonal events, as well as large one-time events, pays tremendous dividends in 
preparedness and prevention and response efforts.  
 
3.  Partnerships with Other First Responders/Preventers 
Effective homeland security requires an interdisciplinary approach and seamless 
cooperation between disciplines. Traditional disagreements between the organizations 
involved in homeland security must be forgotten. In December of 2004, the Department 
of Homeland Security released the National Response Plan (NRP).54 Organizations from 
every discipline associated with homeland security should recognize the need to embrace 
the NRP and should fully cooperate with and participate in the full implementation of the 
                                                 
53 Andrew Sheldon and Greenburg Morabito, Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland 
Security: Law Enforcement–Private Security Partnerships (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, September 2005), NJC 210678, 5. 
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plan. The NRP describes: “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within 
the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other 
emergencies; minimize the damage and recovery from attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies that occur.”55 The purpose of the NRP is: “To establish comprehensive, 
national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of 
activities including prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.”56  
In addition, law enforcement organizations must move beyond what has been 
traditional hubris related to the prevention of and response to terrorists acts. All portions 
of government should work together in a truly interdisciplinary approach to homeland 
security. The law enforcement community can learn much from other disciplines. For 
example, most fire service organizations have mastered the incident command system 
(ICS) that they use every day on almost every operation. Unfortunately, law enforcement 
organizations seldom use ICS and therefore encounter a very steep learning curve when 
ICS and a unified command system are needed and implemented. Law enforcement 
organizations should partner first responders/preventers on a proactive and ongoing basis, 
thereby ensuring appropriate responses to critical incidents as well as day-to-day 
homeland security. 
 
C.  PROBLEM-SOLVING  
The linchpin of effective modern law enforcement is problem-solving. Once they 
are engaged in effective and mutually beneficial partnerships, all the stakeholders must 
be committed to a systematic and effective method of problem solving. One problem- 
solving model very well suited to preventing and responding to homeland security 
incidents is the SARA (scanning for, analyzing, responding to, and assessing) problem-
solving model.57 The SARA model, when adapted as needed by individual organizations, 
                                                 
55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2004), 1. 
56 National Response Plan, 2. 
57 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, “The Sara Model,” 
Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2003 <http://www.popcenter .org/aboutsara.htm> (accessed January 
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serves as an effective tool for organizational homeland security efforts. The SARA 
problem-solving model is flexible and can be easily applied to most problems, large and 
small. The model should be seen and applied, not as a linear fill-in-the-blank model, but 
as a circular model with multiple feedback loops. It makes it possible for an organization 
to be actively engaged simultaneously in scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. In 
addition, at times it may be necessary to respond initially to an event or problem while at 
the same time ensuring proper scanning analyses to facilitate a long-term response and 
ultimate resolution. The most valuable step in the SARA model may be the “assessment” 
step. Traditionally, law enforcement has been less than willing to conduct proper 
assessments of programs or projects.  It is quite possible that systematic and scientific 
assessments of law enforcement actions may uncover failures. Unfortunately, many law 
enforcement organizations, even the most professional, do not see failure as an option; so 
they respond to it in a negative manner, instead of embracing it as a learning opportunity.  
To ensure future success, law enforcement organizations must thoroughly and 
properly evaluate all of their respective programs, including those related to homeland 
security.  This aspect will be discussed in detail later in the “accountability” section of 
this thesis. Proper analyses ensure accountability and transparency in law enforcement 
operations. The requirement for assessment allows organizations to learn from mistakes 
as well as successes while developing a compilation of best practices and lessons learned. 
These best practices and lessons learned can then be applied across a broad spectrum of 
issues, including the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks and other homeland 
security–related issues.  
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Figure 2.   The S.A.R.A. Problem-Solving Model 
 
D.  ACCOUNTABILITY 
A great deal of money, time, and effort has and will continue to go into homeland 
security. Organizations must proactively ensure accountability, transparency, and 
conformity with community mandates. Successful homeland security also involves 
1. SCANNING 
Step 1 
• Laundry list of potential problems (involve all 
stakeholders) 
Step 2 
• Problems identified 
Step 3 
• Problems prioritized 
Step 4 
• State the specific problem 
• List examples of where the problem/s occurs 









Simultaneous Application of the SARA Model 
2. ANALYSIS 
Hypothesis 
• From what you already know; what do you think 
is causing the problem? 
• General goal statement. 
• How will data be gathered and be reported? 
(begin formulating assessment) 
• When will data collection begin? 
Summary of Analysis Steps 
Step 1 
• What conditions or events precede the problem? 
• What conditions or events accompany the 
problem? 
• What are the problem’s consequences? 
• What harms result from the problem? 
Step 2 
• How often does the problem occur? 
• How long has this been a problem? 
• What is the duration of each occurrence of the 
problem? 
• Now that the data has been collected, should 
you continue with analysis or return to 
scanning and restate the problem? 
(*Feedback loops) 
Hypothesis (revise original if needed) 
• What are your conclusions about why the 
problem occurs? 
• Define a tentative goal. 
• Identify resources that may be of assistance in 
solving the problem. 
• What procedures, policies or rules have been 
established to address the problem? 
3. RESPONSE 
Step 1 
• Brainstorm possible interventions (involve all 
stakeholders). 
Step 2  
• Consider feasibility and choose among alternatives. 
• What needs to be done before the problem is 
implemented? 
• Who will be responsible for preliminary actions? 
Step 3 
• Outline the plan and who might be responsible for each 
part. 
• Will this plan accomplish all or part of the goal? 
• State the specific goals this plan will accomplish. 
• What are some ways data might be collected? 
Step 4 
• Realistically, what are the most likely problems with 
implementing the plan? 
• What are some possible procedures to follow when the 
plan is not working? 
• What are some possible procedures to follow when the 
plan is not being implemented correctly? 
Step 5 
• Implement the plan 
4. ASSESSMENT 
Step 1 
• Was the plan implemented? (Partially 
implemented?) 
• What the goal was specified in the response 
phase? 
• Was the goal attained? 
• How do you know the goal was attained? 
Step 2 
• What is likely to happen if the plan is removed? 
• What is likely to happen if the plan remains in 
place? 
• Identify new strategies to increase the 
effectiveness of the plan. 
• How can the plan be monitored in the future? 
Step 3 
• Post-implementation planning 
• Plan modification 
• Follow-up assessment 
• Record operational successes and failures 
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prevention, but measuring prevention is problematic. How can an organization measure 
something that has not occurred? “The ability to measure the prevention of terrorist 
attacks is vitally important for a number of reasons. First, there is the accountability 
issue. The nation, at all levels of government and the private sector, is investing vast 
amounts of funds and effort to ‘prevent the next attack.’”58 
Community policing efforts are often measured at the process level rather than at 
the final outcome level since final outcomes such as prevention are often immeasurable. 
The measure of a homeland security process and distinct pieces of programs and 
strategies likely provides acceptable data for a policy or practice analysis and assessment. 
For example, if an organization wishes to determine the effectiveness of its critical 
infrastructure protection efforts, it could document and measure the steps it takes to reach 
the desired goal. It could set benchmarks for and measure its progress in assessing the 
vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructure within its sphere of influence. Also, the quality 
and number of its business and private sector partnerships may prove an appropriate 
process measurement. In addition, the organization’s participation in information and 
intelligence-sharing efforts related to critical infrastructure protection is measurable and 
appropriate for determining its progress and success in the protection of critical 
infrastructure.  
Individual organizational members, especially supervisors and command staff, 
should also be evaluated for their efforts related to homeland security. And organizations 
should develop appropriate evaluative criteria (process and outcome) for the efforts of 
their respective commands. All efforts related to homeland security should be reported 
and reviewed in the same way that criminal activity is.        
 
E.  CHANGE 
The law enforcement organizations that will ultimately be successful in the war 
on terrorism are those that facilitate and embrace change today. The victors in this 
endeavor will be those that are adaptable, flexible, and resilient. “The process of 
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implementing substantive change in the field of law enforcement requires political 
maneuvering, negotiating positions, bartering political influence, sharing information, 
assessing new directions, and responding to the diverse needs of citizens, elected 
officials, and employees.”59 Resistance to change may be one of the determining reasons 
for adopting a smaller "project-oriented" approach to addressing homeland security 
issues. Homeland security is not a project, it is a philosophy. Law enforcement 
organizations must integrate their homeland security efforts into their overall policing 
philosophy. To effect this change in the most efficient and effective manner possible law 
enforcement organizations must:  
• Involve all stakeholders. Community policing is a valid approach to addressing 
homeland security issues. All personnel should participate. A community policing 
approach to homeland security is not something special that only a select few can 
do. Change means enhancement.  
• Be patient. Worthwhile and effective processes are not implemented overnight in 
a haphazard manner. However, organizations should not settle for traditional 
incrementalism.   
• Be consistent in the application of policies and practices to ensure understanding, 
adherence, and buy-in by all stakeholders.  
• Expect and address resistance. It is normal that change brings resistance. The 
key is to expect and prepare for resistance. Resistance may prompt overall 
improvement in the change process and end results.    
 
F.  TRUST 
 
1.  Racial Profiling (Racially Biased Policing) 
Commitment to professionalism and the public trust is the hallmark of any 
professional law enforcement organization. Law enforcement organizations are 
accountable to the community they serve, to other stakeholders in the fight against 
terrorism, to policy makers, and to their individual members. Each organization’s actions  
 
 
                                                 
59 David L. Carter, “Community Policing and Politics,” (Michigan State University School of 
Criminal Justice, 2006). <www.cj.msu.edu/~people/cp/cppolit.html> (accessed February 27, 2006). 
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related to homeland security should always be in compliance with the United States 
Constitution, the state constitution, and federal, state, tribal, and local law. The rule of 
law should never be compromised.  
The law enforcement community has enjoyed historic reductions in crime by 
identifying and addressing specific acts of criminal behavior, not by targeting individuals. 
American law enforcement will be successful in detecting, deterring, and preventing 
terrorist attacks by continuing successful partnerships and commitment to the rule of law 
and the fair and ethical treatment of all persons. One of the most controversial issues 
associated with homeland security–related enforcement is racial profiling or racially 
biased policing. “Racially biased policing occurs when law enforcement inappropriately 
considers race or ethnicity in deciding with whom and how to intervene in an 
enforcement capacity.”60 Racially biased policing erodes trust and confidence and puts 
law enforcement officers at odds with the very communities they serve and should 
partner with to fight crime and effectively address homeland security. In his February 27, 
2001, address to a joint session of Congress, President George W. Bush declared that 
racial profiling is "wrong and we will end it in America." Organizations should ensure 
that policies are codified to unequivocally forbid racially biased policing. In addition, law 
enforcement organizations should address this issue in a proactive manner through proper 
recruitment, training, and supervision of personnel.  
 
2.  Criminal/Behavioral Profiling 
Although the word “profiling” has many negative connotations, criminal or 
behavioral profiling is an effective and lawful law enforcement tool and technique. 
“Profiling is generally condemned as a very bad thing. In fact [criminal profiling] is the 
basis of all good law enforcement.”61 Criminal profiling is a bona fide activity that helps 
in focusing attention on persons likely to engage in specific crimes based on behaviors, 
                                                 
60 Lorie Fridell et al., Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response (Washington, D.C.: Police 
Executive Research Forum, 2001), 4. 
61 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 129. 
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not race.62 Law enforcement personnel should use every lawful investigative tool 
available to identify potential suspects, to find and arrest those responsible for crimes, 
and to prevent them from committing more criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Law 
enforcement personnel should ensure that all enforcement-related contacts are based upon 
legitimate investigative leads. To qualify as a legitimate investigative lead, the following 
must be true:63 
• The information must be relevant to the locality or time frame of the criminal 
activity.  
• The information must be trustworthy.  
• The information concerning identifying characteristics must be tied to a particular 
criminal incident, a particular criminal scheme, or a particular criminal 
organization.  
 
Effective homeland security requires mutual trust and respect. Law enforcement 
must operate with unquestionable integrity and transparency. Responsible law 
enforcement organizations expect their partners, all of them, in the global war on 
terrorism to do the same. Law enforcement organizations must engage in an effective 
fight against terrorism while ensuring that the rights of all people are upheld. No one at 
any level should tolerate discrimination or illegal profiling, or racially biased policing in 
any form or fashion, by any person or organization. 
 
G.  VISION 
Experts within the homeland security community say that two of the things that 
allowed the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon to happen were a “failure of 
imagination” and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.64 Law enforcement 
                                                 
62 William D. Flores, Position Paper: Non-Biased Policing (San Diego, CA: National Latino Police 
Officers Association), 4. 
63 U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal 
Law Enforcement Agencies, June, 2003 <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
split/documents/guidance_on_race.htmJune 2003/> (accessed March 10, 2006). 
64 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States of America, The 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
of America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 336. 
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organizations must not allow such failures to occur in their jurisdictions. First responders/ 
preventers must learn from the past while keeping an open mind and a constant eye on 
the future. The future must find law enforcement willing and well prepared to deal with 
whatever changes, crises, and challenges it may hold. Organizations must be flexible and 
responsive to the ever-changing challenges of post–9/11 policing. New policing strategies 
such as intelligence-led policing should be examined, instituted, and institutionalized 
when appropriate. 
 
1.  Intelligence-Led Policing   
 One of the most beneficial strategies that a law enforcement organization can 
engage in is intelligence-led policing (ILP). Intelligence-led policing is the collection and 
analysis of information to produce an intelligence end-product designed to inform police 
decision making at both the tactical and the strategic level.65 For intelligence-led policing 
to be effective, it must become an integral part of an agency’s philosophy. It is critical 
that, once integrated, ILP is a management orientation in which intelligence serves as a 
guide to operations, rather than the reverse. Ultimately, ILP is based on a common 
understanding of intelligence and its usefulness in addressing crime, disorder, and the 
fear of crime and disorder, including terrorism. By necessity, law enforcement 
organizations must address terrorism-related issues as criminal acts; therefore, ILP is also 
a strategy that assists with an organization’s homeland security efforts. An effective 
implementation and ongoing engagement in ILP requires seamless integration into an 
organization’s overall community-policing efforts. In addition, it is absolutely essential 
that ethical and civil rights issues are properly addressed. Finally, an organization that 
wishes to effectively implement and engage in ILP must ensure that mechanisms and 
practices are in place to ensure the proper sharing of intelligence data. 
Intelligence-led policing is a systematic enhancement of proactive problem-
solving strategies which are integral to community policing. Proactive problem-solving 
                                                 
65 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Intelligence-led Policing: A Definition, RCMP Criminal 
Intelligence Program, January 27, 2005 <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ crimint/intelligence_e.htm> 
(accessed July 8, 2005). 
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strategies require an organization to develop an analytic capacity necessary for both 
intelligence collection and intelligence analysis. The bedrock of police problem-solving 
is the SARA model (scanning for, analyzing, responding to, and assessing problems). The 
SARA model dovetails nicely with the intelligence-led policing crime reduction 




Figure 3.   S.A.R.A. Problem Solving 
Model 






                                                 
66 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-led Policing,” Australian Institute of Criminology-Trends & Issues 
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Figure 5.   An intelligence-led policing and crime reduction process 
 
An effective ILP program is built from the bottom up and begins with street-level 
officers. To collect quality intelligence data, street officers must receive quality training 
in the collection and analysis of intelligence data. Although the primary responsibility for 
data analysis rest with an organization’s intelligence analysts, analysis training of line 
officers enhances their understanding of the data needed and how the data and 
information applies to the overall intelligence cycle. This can greatly enhance 
organizational members’ collection efforts.  
 
a.  Ethical and Civil Rights Issues 
Any organization that engages in ILP must understand the significant 
ethical and civil rights issues associated with the intelligence cycle. Numerous citizens’ 
groups have expressed concern at the national level about the USA PATRIOT Act and at 
the local level about the types of personal information that are collected and retained in 
files at local law enforcement organizations. As part of a public education effort, 
organizations must assure the community that it will maintain the highest level of legal 
and ethical standards in the collection of intelligence data and the storing and 
dissemination of intelligence. The development and publication of specific and  
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transparent policies prior to the implementation of ILP is absolutely essential. The  
policies and procedures should specifically address civil rights issues and an agency's 
responses to those issues.  
 
b.  Intelligence Sharing 
Intelligence sharing is an essential aspect of ILP. Adjacent communities as 
well as state and federal members of the law enforcement community are an individual 
agency’s most obvious and likely most valuable intelligence partners. However, the 
organization must not limit itself to proximate partners. Full participation in an 
appropriate intelligence fusion center and the exploitation of other intelligence-sharing 
opportunities are essential.  
A genuine organization-wide commitment to complete intelligence-led 
policing may initially cause significant organizational stress. However, the recognition 
that ILP is simply an extension and enhancement of the organization’s ongoing 
community-policing philosophy should alleviate some of the apprehension.  
Line officers and other organizational members who are already tasked to 
their reasonable limits will be assigned additional training tasks and responsibilities. 
However, the benefits of intelligence-led policing are beyond measure. The importance 
and value of timely, accurate intelligence cannot be overstated. The capability to 
effectively share intelligence with the law enforcement community as well as the 
intelligence community as a whole will position the organization to properly address the 
community’s homeland security needs. In addition, ILP will assist in the overall 
reduction of crime and disorder and the public’s fear of crime and disorder. 
Twenty-first-century law enforcement organizations must recognize the 
importance of intelligence. A firm commitment to the lawful and ethical gathering of 
intelligence data, the proper processing and exploitation of the gathered data, the expert 
analysis and production of the processed data, and the lawful and ethical dissemination of 
the intelligence product is critical. Crime, including acts of terrorism, does not respect 
organizational boundaries; cooperation and collaboration with other members of the law-
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enforcement and intelligence communities is vital. To provide the best possible service to 
its citizens, an organization must become a contributing member of the intelligence 
community. The immediate and complete implementation of an intelligence-led policing 
model will greatly assist organizations in meeting the law enforcement and homeland 
security challenges of the twenty-first century. 
 
H.  EMPOWERMENT  
Law enforcement organizations must develop organizational structures and 
environments that reflect their community’s values and that facilitate joint citizen, 
employee, business group, and industry empowerment in homeland security–related 
issues. The entire law enforcement community should understand the need to focus on 
solving homeland security issues in creative ways. Law enforcement organizations must 
grant greater autonomy to all members of their organizations, especially line officers. 
“Empowering officers at lower levels with decision-making authority and familiarizing 
them with making (and taking responsibility for) important decisions could be of value in 
a crisis”67 Greater autonomy implies enhanced trust and respect for their organizational 
members’ professionalism judgment as law enforcement professionals. Community 
members and business partners must share in the rights and responsibilities implicit in 
identifying, prioritizing, and solving homeland security–related problems, recognizing 
that they are full-fledged partners with the law enforcement community. 
 
I.  LEADERSHIP 
Leaders in law enforcement organizations can provide leadership in the homeland 
security realm by appropriately and skillfully influencing their members, individual 
citizens, groups, and business partners. Law enforcement leaders must provide purpose, 
direction, and motivation while operating to prevent terrorist attacks in their respective 
communities and providing for an effective response to and recovery from a terrorist 
attack should one occur. Leaders at all levels should “prepare relentlessly” and 
                                                 
67 Matthew C. Scheider and Robert Chapman, Community Policing and Terrorism, April 2003 
<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Scheider-Chapman.html> (accessed January 26, 2006). 
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understand that “everyone’s accountable, all of the time.”68 Individuals and organizations 
should also exercise appropriate “followship” when necessary, recognizing that, at times, 
it will be more appropriate for other homeland security partners to take the lead.  
 
1.  Strategic Planning   
The institutionalization of homeland security is of such vital importance that it 
cannot be left to chance or become an afterthought. The weaving of homeland security 
into the core fabric of law enforcement organizations is imperative. Therefore, 
organizations that wish to effectively institutionalize homeland security should include it 
in their strategic planning. Strategic planning is “a disciplined effort to produce 
fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization (or any 
other entity) is, what is does, and why it does it.69  Effective implementation of any 
strategic plans requires sound leadership throughout the entire strategic planning process. 
Developing effective programs, projects, action plans, budgets, and implementation 
processes will bring life to the strategies and create more tangible immediate and long-
term value for the organization (or community) its stakeholders’ mandates are met and 
the mission fulfilled.70    
 
                                                 
68 Rudolph W. Giuliani, Leadership (New York: Hyperion, 2002). 
69 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to 
Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 3rd edition (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 
2004), 6. 
70 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 238. 
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Figure 6.   Strategic Planning Model71 
  
Characteristics of an effective strategy to institutionalize homeland security in a 
local law enforcement organization include: 
• Technically feasible  
• Politically acceptable  
• Fits organization’s philosophy and values  
• Ethical, moral and legal  
• Deals with the issue that it is supposed to address 
 
                                                 
71 J. M. Bryson and F. Alston, Creating and Implementing Your Strategic Plan. 2nd edition (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005); quoted in Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit 
Organizations, 3rd edition, 7. 
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Technical feasibility is not limited to equipment. Numerous industries have 
cropped up to address the nation’s homeland security needs, and new technology is 
developed daily. Often the most overlooked aspect of the introduction of new technology 
is the training of personnel to effectively use the new technology. This very necessary 
training is often time consuming and, at times, very costly. In addition, the ongoing 
maintenance and upkeep of technology is often overlooked, especially if additional 
personnel costs are associated with the maintenance and upkeep of new technology. 
The importance of ensuring a strategies’ political acceptability can not be 
overstated. Failure to recognize this fact can doom a strategy to failure. Buy-in from all 
stakeholders will help ensure the strategies success in both the implementation phase and 
the ongoing operation of the program. Elected officials, through proper channels, should 
be fully educated about strategies that have wide-ranging effect on the community. This 
is especially true for strategies that address such hot-button topic as homeland security. 
Strategies that do not fit the organization’s philosophy and values have little 
chance for success. Therefore, it is essential to ensure the strategy is linked at every step 
to the organizations vision, values and mission. In addition, organizations must naturally 
discard any strategy that is not ethical, moral and legal.  
Often, at the end of a planning process, the strategy that is created does not 
actually address the specific issue for which it was created. Strategies and program can 
morph throughout the creation and implementation process, thus rendering them 
ineffective. However, it is very possible that the realized strategy (a blend of what is 
intended and what work in practice)72 actually may not resemble the strategy envisioned 
at the inception of the planning process, but if this strategy meets the aforementioned 
criteria pragmatism should prevail. Organizations should be especially aware on “mission  
 
 
                                                 
72 H. Mintzberg and F. Westley, “Cycles of Organizational Change,” Strategic Management 
Journal13 (1992), 39–59; quoted in Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 
3rd edition, 238. 
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creep” and attempting to do too much with a particular strategy, especially those actions 
which the strategy was not intended to address but were simply bootstrapped to the 
strategy for convenience.  
 
a.  Implementation Roles and Responsibilities 
Effective strategy implementation requires appropriate leadership. Law 
enforcement organizations should ensure that highly qualified leaders with a good 
knowledge of the organization and its culture are tasked with strategy implementation. A 
leader which wishes to help his or her organization institutionalize homeland security 
must have demonstrated a firm commitment to and understanding of the organizations 
commitment to community policing and the need for homeland security 
institutionalization. These leaders should have the authority and the flexibility to institute 
change in innovative and pragmatic ways if necessary. In addition, homeland security 
leaders should understand the likelihood that they may face significant resistance from 
the community, other stake holders and the authorizing environment, which is politicians 
and governmental overseers at every levels. Leaders should understand that “the greater 
the legitimacy behind a decision, [the decision to institutionalize homeland security] the 
harder it is to ignore or reverse, and the stronger the mandate.”73  In addition, competition 
for and the best use of scarce recourses (public budgets) is always a significant issue. 
This issue is exacerbated by public apathy in the absence of ongoing terrorist attacks in 
America, and an acceptance of a “new normalcy” in which the nation becomes callused 
to the possibility of terrorists attacks and resigns itself to the realization “that the threat of 
terrorism can never be completely eliminated and that no level of resources can prevent 
the United States from being attacked in the future.”74  
 
 
                                                 
73 Mark H. Moor, Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 126. 
74 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Forging America’s New Normalcy (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003), 1. 
   
43 
J.  FEAR REDUCTION 
Most progressive law enforcement organizations have codified mission statements 
which not only address the organization’s desire to reduce crime and disorder but also 
include some reference to the organization’s desire to reduce fear of crime and disorder. 
Fear of crime is a serious issue which organizations must actively and aggressively 
address. While crime is a major problem in many cities, citizen fear of crime often 
exceeds the actual risk of being victimized. This phenomenon is also true for fear of 
terrorism, perhaps more so.  Although terrorism is at its root a political act rather than a 
criminal act, the effects of terrorism, especially the fear of terrorism are no different and 
may be more severe than the effect of crime in a community. Therefore, since one of the 
primary goals of terrorist acts or threats is to instill fear, any strategy intended to 
effectively address terrorism must include fear reduction. 
Law enforcement organizations, especially at the local level are usually the most 
capable of taking the lead in a multidisciplinary effort to reduce a community’s fear of 
terrorism. Local law enforcement organizations are usually the largest, most professional 
and most recognizable segments of local government. In addition a sizeable segment of 
the population holds the law enforcement community in high esteem and trusts law 
enforcement organizations  
The advent and success of community policing has equipped law enforcement 
organizations with community contacts, public support, and partnerships which are 
invaluable in addressing any issue in the community, more especially, the reduction of 
fear associated with terrorism.  
Organizations which have embraced and institutionalized community policing 
have the professional “tools” and the organizational culture in-place to facilitate their 
success in terrorism fear reduction. Organizations must address fear reduction 
holistically, rather than incrementally. Addressing fear preemptively (before a terrorist 
event) will better position local law enforcement organizations to address fear during 
actual terrorist events and during the recovery from terrorist attacks. Organizations 
should understand the effects of terrorism, including fear, do are not limited to those 
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event which may or do occur within their respective corporate limits. Terrorist acts 
throughout the nation, and at times, the world can promote fear within a community. For 
example, an attack by a suicide terrorist in a shopping mall anywhere in the Unites States, 
would adversely affect all shopping malls throughout the United States. “The primary 
target [of a terrorist attack] is not those actually killed or injured in the attack, but those 
made to witness it.”75  The media’s focus on such events ensures the entire nation 
becomes a defacto witnesses to the terrorist act; likely resulting in widespread fear. To 
confirm this notion one need only recall the fear of those persons whom worked in high-
rise buildings post 9/11 as they scrambled to procure emergency breathing apparatus and 
escape parachutes.76 
 
1.  Personnel Training 
 Once an organization has come to the realization that it must reduce fear of 
terrorism in its community, and that it has the capabilities to do so, the organization 
should develop a plan to achieve this goal. The most beneficial first step a law 
enforcement organization can undertake is to educate its members about terrorism and 
train its members how to respond to various acts of terrorism. This will lead to the 
accomplishment of an all-important first goal- the reduction of fear of terrorism by the 
organization’s personnel. Although the community might expect that members of their 
local law enforcement organization understand terrorism, its causes, and all of the 
nuances associate with responding to terrorist acts, it is likely that many law enforcement 
officers and employees know little more than the average citizen about terrorism. 
Therefore, it is essential that an organization provide training to ensure their personnel 
understand terrorism and can engage in an intelligent informed conversation about 
terrorism when needed, and most importantly, can effectively respond to an act of 
terrorism if required. Education and training will form a strong foundation for the 
organization’s future prevention, response and recovery efforts. All members of the 
                                                 
75 Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299 (7 March 2003), 1534. 
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organization should receive training appropriate for their respective positions. Both 
commissioned and non-commissioned personnel should receive training.  
Training should include classroom or on-line training which conveys an 
understanding of terrorism including its history, causes, organization and tactics. In 
addition, training in equipment usage such as how to dawn, wear and operate in any 
protective equipment. Employee confidence is boosted and fear reduced by participation 
and success in disaster drills designed to test all phases of prevention of, the response to 
and recovery from terrorist incidents.  
Next, organizations which have developed effective partnerships can leverage 
those partnerships to help ensure a better informed community. People fear the unknown; 
therefore, a better informed and educated community will greatly reduce the fear 
associated with terrorism. Collaboration with community groups, business groups and 
civic organizations can greatly enhance a law enforcement organization’s community 
education efforts. These are the organizations most likely to embrace the law 
enforcement message and can become informed ambassadors to the rest of the 
community. 
 
2.  The Media 
As previously mentioned, the media plays a significant roll in the community’s 
fear of terrorism. Working with the media can pay significant dividends in fear reduction. 
“The media have the opportunity to play a significant positive role in the community. The 
media have an implicit responsibility to keep the public informed about current events 
and can help relay messages in the most efficient and effective way. They can also serve 
the role of reassurance and comfort to people in time of confusion and uncertainty.”77 
A relationship or partnership with the media may not always be pleasant for a law 
enforcement organization. At times the media will report incidents or subjects that may 
                                                 
77 Adrienne S. Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, Chapter. 2: Developing Strategies 
for Minimizing the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism Through Prevention, Intervention, and 
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not shed a favorable light on a law enforcement organization; however, transparency and 
honesty with the media will payoff in the long run. Organizations must constantly 
remember that they are doing the people’s business and they should not fear the reporting 
of their efforts and actions. 
American law enforcement organizations must develop strategies to effectively 
prevent, respond to and respond to acts of terrorism. Any terrorism strategy must include 
fear reduction. Law enforcement organizations can reduce the fear of terrorism in their 
communities through education and training. Eliminating the unknown through training 
and educating their personnel and educating the public through community partnerships 
and symbiotic relationships with the media can and will reduce public fear of terrorism. 
When fear is eliminated, terrorist loose a significant portion of their power and 
effectiveness thus achieving a victory or victories in the global war on terrorism.   
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A.  TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY POLICING 
Twenty-first-century law enforcement organizations face a new and significant 
challenge — homeland security. On September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies 
throughout the United States were thrust into the “war on terrorism.” Since then, most 
law enforcement organizations have responded to the terrorist threat as best they can, 
given limited resources, an unclear mission in homeland security, unclear policies for 
dealing with political and civil liberties issues, the demands of their ongoing day-to-day 
law enforcement jobs, and an uncertain commitment to what is often perceived as a 
federal responsibility. The current law enforcement business-as-usual attitude and 
incremental programmatic responses to homeland security issues is no longer acceptable.  
Terrorist attacks or a natural disaster is at first a local issue which will is responded to by 
local first responders. Local law enforcement organizations must recognize and embrace 
the critical and essential role they have to play in maintaining security in their 
communities and in addressing key issue pertinent to the war on terrorism and natural 
disasters. Preparedness for attacks on their communities or for terrorists’ potential use of 
their communities to plan and launch an attack is key to the success as both first 
responders and first preventers.   
In that context, community policing is one of the most successful strategies that 
law enforcement organizations can continue to develop and use as a tool to assist in 
homeland security institutionalization. Community policing focuses on crime and social 
disorder through the delivery of police services that include aspects of traditional law 
enforcement, prevention, problem solving, community engagement, and partnerships. 
Community policing has had a dramatic, positive effect in America’s communities: over 
a sustained period of time, it has helped law enforcement organizations substantially to 
reduce crime rates and the fear of crime in their communities. 
Although many organizations have experienced some success from applying 
community policing principles on a limited or a programmatic basis, it is clear that those 
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organizations that have institutionalized community policing, that is, adopting it as a core 
philosophy or philosophical underpinning, have experienced the greatest successes. 
Organizations that desire long-term success in their critical homeland security efforts can 
take a positive step toward this goal by using community policing principles as a template 
combined with other progressive policing practices to institutionalize homeland security. 
To achieve the greatest effectiveness, homeland security, like community policing, must 
be adopted throughout the organization, integrating the homeland security responsibility 
into the agency’s mission statement, values, goals, policies and procedures, training 
programs, and other systems and activities that define an organizational culture.   
The institutionalization of homeland security will not only make America’s 
communities safer, but also may reduce crime and disorder and the public’s fear of crime 
and disorder. This process will in turn enable local law enforcement organizations to 
address their homeland security mandate while fulfilling their primary function. At some 
point in time, the line between homeland security and everyday policing will be 
indistinguishable. At that point, homeland security institutionalization will have been 
achieved. Failing to accomplish this could prove very costly, in both monetary and 
human terms. 
 
B.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS   
This thesis argues that local law enforcement organizations have an important role 
to play in homeland security and, to most effectively fulfill that role; they must 
institutionalize homeland security concepts, principles, and practices.  Furthermore, the 
thesis suggests that institutionalization can best be achieved through the application of 
community policing principles to homeland security.   
To begin the institutionalization process, each organization must first officially 
integrate homeland security by codifying, the homeland security responsibility into the 
agency’s mission statement, goals, policies and procedures, training programs, and other 
systems and activities that define the overall organizational culture. In doing so, each 
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organization must identify the change processes that will be most effective in their 
individual organizations and then aggressively pursue the needed changes.  
These processes of institutionalization and change should not be limited to law 
enforcement organizations, however, because terrorism and homeland security are not 
simply law enforcement problems. The twenty-first-century challenge of terrorism will 
be met most efficiently by resilient communities that have institutionalized homeland 
security on a community-wide basis. The law enforcement community can act perhaps as 
a catalyst for this institutionalization in concert with other first responders/preventers 
such as the fire service, the emergency management community and the medical 
community. But true community-wide homeland security institutionalization will only be 
achieved if and when every member of the community, especially public servants, 
understands and is able and willing to fulfill a vital role in the prevention of, the response 
to, and the recovery from terrorist attacks.   
Absent a clear and present threat, it is likely that one significant challenge will be 
to maintain the momentum of homeland security institutionalization. Thus organizations 
must resist the tendency to become complacent. Although some equipment and training 
are applicable only to law enforcement’s homeland security responsibilities, whenever 
possible, they should strive for duel functionality. This combined effort will better ensure 
the most efficient and effective use of precious law enforcement time and talent and 
scarce public resources, while making America’s communities safer places to live, work, 
and play. 
 
C.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH   
The local law enforcement establishment’s movement to homeland security 
institutionalize is in its infancy. And any reliable and valid academic research that 
highlights effective and generally applicable homeland security practices and strategies 
for law enforcement organizations would be very beneficial. In addition, research that 
highlights the effect that homeland security has had on community policing and the 
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policing profession as a whole could assist in developing the strategies that will be 
needed to address the next rendition of terrorist threats and natural disasters. 
Research that leads to policy and training recommendations to assist the nation’s 
law enforcement organizations in specific prevention, response, and recovery activities 
would be extremely valuable. For example, though suicide bombers have become 
effective weapons for terrorist organizations, very few American law enforcement 
organizations are trained and equipped to respond to this looming threat. In addition, 
other forms of terrorist attacks and natural disasters, such as hurricanes or a pandemic flu 
catastrophe, which would affect a large region of the country, would pose a significant 
challenge for the entire homeland security community. Aggressive affirmative steps are 
needed to overcome these shortcomings. In sum, the concept of “resilient communities” 
and the development of a holistic community approach to homeland security that includes 
all factions of government — local, regional, state, federal, and private sector — benefits 
all aspects of our national homeland security mission and responsibility.  
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